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The
International Market for Encryption |
by Stewart Baker and Richard Barth,
Symposium on Information, National Policies & Intl Infrastructure
(30/01/1996) |
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In this conference, Stewart A. Baker
makes a description of various government encryption policies (US,
France, Israel, Russia, China and Japan), as well as an exploration
of different forms of control (import controls, export controls and
use controls). In the second part, Richard C. Barth explains why the
inevitable emergence of internationally accepted encryption standards,
and the ability of sophisticated companies to sidestep government
controls on the export, import, and use of encryption, will certainly
doom the unilateral efforts of individual governments to prevent the
emergence of secure international communications. |
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A
Study of the International Market for Computer Software with Encryption |
prepared by the U.S. Department of
Commerce and the National Security Agency (1996) |
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This study aims at assessing the
current and future international market for software products containing
encryption and the impact of export controls on the U.S. software
industry. As for the market for software products containing encryption,
it is still small and essentially made of products tailored to national
markets, but is expected to grow exponentially in the next ten years,
due to the acceptance and usage of global networks, and the development
and use of electronic commerce. For this reason, the fact there is
a significant number of foreign security-specific software products
with encryption features, predominantly from Western Europe, could
represent a threat for US software firms. Yet, a study of U.S. competitiveness
and market share in 31 foreign countries where encryption is thought
to have significant demand shows that U.S. market share is keeping
pace with overall demand despite the impact of U.S. export controls,
although U. S. encryption products are often perceived to be of unsatisfactory
quality. This would be due to the absence of significant foreign competition. |
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Cryptography
Policy : The Guidelines and the Issues |
by the Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development (1997) |
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Guidelines for Cryptography Policies
drafted by the OECD, in order to identify the issues which should
be taken into consideration in the formulation of the cryptography
policies at the national and international level. The recommendations
of OECD include the coordination and cooperation at an international
level in order to find practical and operational solutions in the
area of international cryptography policy (which implies the development
of technical standards for cryptographic methods), the removal of
unjustified obstacles to international trade and the development of
information and communication networks, and the clear statement of
of national controls imposed by governments relating to the use of
cryptography. These guidelines also inclue a Report on Background
and Issues of Cryptography Policy to explain the context for the Guidelines
and the basic issues involved in the cryptography policy debate. |
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International
Views of Key Recovery |
Statement by Ambassador David Aaron, RSA Data
Security Conference (28/01/1998) |
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This speech made by Ambassador David
Aaron, Special Envoy for Cryptography to the RSA Data Security Conference
in San Francisco, explains that, in the interest of public safety,
many governments are likely to implement strong encryption controls
and key-recovery initiatives, and are willing to cooperate with the
US government in order to make strong encryption work across international
boundaries. After citing several cases where encryption was used in
terrorist plots, drug dealing, child pornography and espionage, Ambassador
David Aaron stresses the need for law enforcement to "maintain,
in the face of technological change, the current legal instruments
it has", while keeping the privacy of individual and businesses. |
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ECHELON:
America's Secret Global Surveillance Network |
by Patrick S. Poole, Privacy Papers (2000) |
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This paper describes the NSA's efforts
in creating a global spy system, codename ECHELON, which captures
and analyzes virtually every phone call, fax, email and telex message
sent anywhere in the world. Operated in conjunction with the Government
Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ) of England, the Communications
Security Establishment (CSE) of Canada, the Australian Defense Security
Directorate (DSD), and the General Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB) of New Zealand, ECHELON is not only used to spy on terrorists,
but also for political spying and commercial espionage. The paper
suggests that Congress start finding out if ECHELON really represents
a threat to the liberties of American people and watch out for the
Constitutional rights and liberties of the American people. |
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Intelligence
Tests |
by Art Jahnke, CIO Magazine (15/01/2000) |
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This article presents stories about
the surveillance systems put in place by the American government in
order to monitor private communications of individuals and corporations.
Fidnet, a federal plan to allow government
agents to monitor e-mail communications and other information moving
across private networks, has been killed by the Congress and
a broad coalition of popular forces in 1999. Yet, a surveillance system
called Echelon is being operated by the NSA and does internationally
what Fidnet would have done domestically, violating European laws. |
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Who
Holds the Key ? A Comparative Study of US and European Encryption
Policies |
by Sarah Andrews, The Journal of Information,
Law and Technology (29/02/2000) |
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This paper looks at the tension between
law enforcement agencies and governments on one side, and privacy
advocates as well as business interest groups on the other side, in
the encryption debate. It also studies how law makers in the US and
Europe have chosen to meet the challenge of regulating this area.
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Civil
Liberties and Security in Cyberspace |
by Ekaterina A. Drozdova, Center for International
Security and Cooperation (08/2000) |
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This report deals with the legal standards
which govern the measures to protect information systems, and their
evolution as the threat of attack grows. Whereas the policing of computer
networks is a real threat to privacy and other civil liberties, systems
set up for preventing, tracking and punishing crimes are more and
more necessary. Thus there is a need for a legal framework that can
balance the needs for civil liberties and the needs for security in
cyberspace, a set of non-technical constraints which should be placed
on the design and implementation of the solutions that will facilitate
law enforcement. The aim of the author here is to present the legal
principles that are broadly applicable and what has been done in various
countries or international organizations in terms of privacy protection
in cyberspace. |
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